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1513 
TAXATION WITHOUT IMMUNIZATION: EXERCISING THE 
FEDERAL TAXING POWER TO INCREASE CHILDHOOD 
VACCINATION RATES 
Nicholas R. Consalvo* 
Abstract 
This Note will discuss the need to exercise the taxing power of the 
federal government in an effort to restore immunization rates to their 
historically high levels. Recent spikes in unvaccinated children have 
resulted in global outbreaks of diseases that were near elimination. This 
Note’s solution to the growing anti-vaccination movement is the 
implementation of a federal tax plan targeted at parents who—without a 
valid medical exemption—refuse to vaccinate their children against 
specific classes of vaccine-preventable diseases. This federal tax plan 
could take the form of an income-based tax, or loss of child tax credits, 
enforced against parents based on the age and amount of time their child 
has remained unvaccinated.  
Global efforts to increase vaccination rates and fight outbreaks have 
already resulted in similar fines and taxes as those advocated in this Note. 
Currently, the entire public is responsible for the burden of funding 
initiatives to treat and prevent outbreaks caused by parents who abuse 
nonmedical exemptions to evade existing vaccination mandates. That 
burden must shift and fall only upon the individuals who refuse to 
acknowledge that immunizing against vaccine-preventable diseases is a 
fundamental necessity for preserving public health.  
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In 1736 I lost one of my sons, a fine boy of four years old, 
by the small-pox, taken in the common way. I long regretted 
bitterly, and still regret that I had not given it to him by 
inoculation. This I mention for the sake of the parents who 
omit that operation, on the supposition that they should never 
forgive themselves if a child died under it; my example 
showing that the regret may be the same either way, and that, 
therefore, the safer should be chosen.1 
      – Benjamin Franklin 
INTRODUCTION 
Resistance to immunization has been persistent since the first 
vaccination efforts in the early nineteenth century.2 Unlike in previous 
eras, the recent spike in unvaccinated children is not attributable to 
isolated anti-vaccination groups, but anti-vaccine activities in major 
metropolitan areas.3 Recently, for example, historically low vaccination 
rates have resulted in measles outbreaks4 across the country—a disease 
                                                                                                                 
 1. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 244 (John Bigelow ed., 
Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co., London, Trübner & Co., 1868).  
 2. Linda E. LeFever, Comment, Religious Exemptions from School Immunization: A 
Sincere Belief or a Legal Loophole, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (2006). 
 3. See Jacqueline K. Olive et al., Correction: The State of the Antivaccine Movement in 
the United States: A Focused Examination of Nonmedical Exemptions in States and Counties, 
PLOS MED. (July 6, 2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal. 
pmed.1002616 [https://perma.cc/Q36B-3ANG]. 
 4. Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-
outbreaks.html [https://perma.cc/MZ4J-JRXE]. 
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declared “eliminated” by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) in 2000.5 Growing parental concerns about the safety and efficacy 
of vaccines have pushed families to opt their children out of “mandatory” 
vaccinations required for school entry.6 Nonmedical exemptions (NMEs) 
based on religious or philosophical beliefs are consistently used and 
abused by parents seeking to avoid these mandatory vaccination 
requirements.7  
So why the sudden decrease in vaccination rates? The skepticism 
towards immunization is actually the result of a slowly evolving trend 
spanning the last two decades. A major factor in the public outcry against 
immunizations is a 1998 article published by the British medical journal 
The Lancet.8 The article alleged a causal link between the Measles 
Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism.9 The study, conducted 
by Dr. Andrew Wakefield, was based on the evaluation of twelve autistic 
children and caused widespread panic among parents who began refusing 
mandatory vaccinations for their children.10 In 2004, however, The 
Lancet released findings that Dr. Wakefield’s research was flawed and 
heavily influenced by funding from solicitors seeking to sue the vaccine 
manufacturers on behalf of parents.11 The journal released a statement 
explaining that the researchers “had conducted invasive investigations on 
the children without obtaining the necessary ethical clearances . . . [they] 
picked and chose data that suited their case; they falsified facts.”12 The 
autism scare caused Britain’s immunization rates to plummet from 92% 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Measles History, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/measles/about/history.html 
[https://perma.cc/AMC2-CVJH].  
 6. See LeFever, supra note 2, at 1054. 
 7. See Jennifer L. Richards et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements 
in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal Analysis of Trends and Associated Community Factors, 31 
VACCINE 3009, 3012 (2013).  
 8. See generally A. J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-
Specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 LANCET 637 (1998).  
 9. See id. at 640.  




 11. See Richard Horton, A Statement by The Editors of The Lancet, LANCET (Feb. 23, 2004), 
http://image.thelancet.com/extras/statement20Feb2004web.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE94-7WLS]. 
 12. The Science Facts About Autism and Vaccines, HEALTHCARE MGMT. DEGREE GUIDE 
(emphasis omitted), https://www.healthcare-management-degree.net/autism-vaccines/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4DTL-F7WQ]. After reports alleging the 1998 article’s fabrication surfaced, the Lancet 
formally retracted the article in 2010. See Editorial, Retraction—Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular 
Hyperplasia, Non-Specific Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 375 
LANCET 445, 445 (2010), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S014067361060175 
4?via%3Dihub [https://perma.cc/3FXC-6RPU].  
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in 1995 to 81% at the start of 2005.13 During that time, the number of 
reported measles cases more than tripled.14 While the article was 
eventually discredited as “utterly false,” the damage was already done as 
the falsehood spread globally.15  
The most significant consequence of declining immunization rates 
and the failure to vaccinate is the risk posed to herd immunity. When a 
large enough percentage of the population is immunized against a 
disease, herd immunity serves as a protective barrier against the spread 
of infection to individuals who are not immunized or whose immune 
systems are otherwise compromised.16 As vaccination rates decrease, 
both those immunized and those who remain unvaccinated are at an 
increased risk of infection.17 “[T]he safety of the entire [herd] community 
is jeopardized when overall immunization rates fall below” what experts 
call a “critical threshold.”18 Herd immunity does not require a one 
hundred percent immunization rate, so “it is not necessary for every 
single [member of] a community to be vaccinated. However, herd 
immunity can exist only if a sufficiently high proportion of the population 
is immunized such that the transmission of the disease is effectively 
interrupted.”19 Therefore, a community cannot allow even a sizeable 
minority of its members to “free ride” on the protection afforded by its 
vaccinated members; otherwise no member can enjoy the benefits of herd 
immunity.20 
This Note will discuss the need for the federal government to exercise 
its constitutional taxing power in an effort to save herd immunity and 
restore immunization rates to their historically high levels. Part I details 
the case law establishing the power of the states to mandate vaccinations. 
This line of cases establishes the policy foundation behind the need for 
compulsory childhood immunizations. Furthermore, the United States 
Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases articulate the origins of the 
modern medical, religious, and personal-belief exemptions that will be at 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Roy Richard Grinker, Offit Paul: Autism’s False Prophets: Bad Science, Risky 
Medicine and the Search for a Cure, 39 J. AUTISM DEV. DISORD. 544, 544 (2008).  
 14. Id. 
 15. See Sarah Boseley, Lancet Retracts ‘Utterly False’ MMR Paper, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 
2010, 11:29), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/feb/02/lancet-retracts-mmr-paper 
[https://perma.cc/RLY8-GU97].  
 16. Walter A. Orenstein et al., Public Health Considerations-United States, in VACCINES 
1006 (Stanley A. Plotkin & Walter A. Orenstein eds., 3d ed. 1999). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out 
of Vaccinating Their Children, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 419 (2004). 
 19. Id. at 420. 
 20. Id.  
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issue in this Note’s suggested federal tax solution.21 Part II will then 
discuss these exemptions in greater length, along with an expanded view 
of their effect on herd immunity. 
This Note’s solution to the growing anti-vaccination movement, 
discussed in Parts III and IV, is the implementation of a federal tax plan 
targeted at parents who—without a valid medical exemption—refuse to 
vaccinate their children against specific classes of vaccine-preventable 
diseases. This proposed federal tax plan can work in one of two forms. 
The first form is an affirmative income tax issued to parents based on the 
age and the amount of time their child has remained unvaccinated. This 
tax would be based on household income and paid directly to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) via yearly tax returns. Alternatively, the proposed 
federal tax plan could fit within existing tax regulations: parents who fail 
to vaccinate their child without a legitimate exemption would lose their 
current child tax credits when filing their yearly taxes.  
While these penalties may seem drastic, this plan is consistent with 
tax penalties imposed in other developed countries around the world. For 
example, Australia recently implemented a “No Jab, No Pay” policy 
where parents lose $28 AUD (just under $20 USD) biweekly from their 
tax benefits for each child not up to date with their immunizations.22 
Similarly, parents in Italy who refuse to vaccinate their children, in 
addition to being prohibited from enrolling them in public or private 
schools, face fines between €500 and €7,500 ($553 to $8,305 USD).23 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Over the past decade, rates of NMEs from school immunization requirements have 
increased dramatically. See Richards et al., supra note 7, at 3010. While not its primary function, 
this Note will also advocate for a stricter application of current NMEs. To maintain herd immunity 
and prevent the abuse of NMEs, only established medical exemptions should justify non-
vaccination and excuse penalties otherwise imposed under this Note’s suggested tax plan. 
 22. See Lucy Pasha-Robinson, Australia to Issue Monthly Fines to Parents Who Don’t 
Vaccinate Children, INDEPENDENT (July 3, 2018, 3:16 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/ 
world/australasia/parents-fined-children-vaccinations-measles-mmr-australia-baby-jabs-a84285 
96.html [https://perma.cc/3BJL-NHBC] (“Previously, parents whose children were not up to date 
with vaccinations would lose an end of year payment to their family tax benefit, worth A$737. 
The new fortnightly sanction will see parents lose out on roughly the same amount but is said to 
serve as a more ‘constant reminder’[.] . . . The move is part of an ongoing clampdown by the 
Australian government on the ‘anti-vaxxer’ movement after the percentage of children under 
seven with a ‘conscientious objection’ to immunization rose from 0.23 per cent in December 1999 
to 1.77 per cent in December 2014, according to Australia’s parliament. Minister for Social 
Services Dan Tehan said the clampdown was necessary to protect public health.”). For currency 
conversion rates used to update the monetary figures throughout this paragraph see Foreign 
Exchange Rates – H.10 Weekly, Fed. Reserve (last visited Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/current/ [https://perma.cc/TE9Q-KH8J]. 
 23. Einav Keet, Europe Responds to Recent Measles Outbreaks with Tougher Vaccination 
Laws, CONTAGIONLIVE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.contagionlive.com/news/europe-responds-
to-recent-measles-outbreaks-with-tougher-vaccination-laws [https://perma.cc/N8RW-ABVC].  
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And parents in Germany and Romania who fail to follow health ministry 
requirements on vaccination face penalties up to €2,500 ($2,768 USD) 
and €2,200 ($2,420 USD), respectively.24 Implementation of similar 
penalties in the United States is justified by the public policy arguments 
advanced in cases establishing the police power of the states,25 as well as 
the Court’s landmark decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).26 There, the Court used a broad 
interpretation of the Taxing and Spending Clause to uphold the minimum 
coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA).27 
I.  HISTORY OF THE STATE’S POWER TO MANDATE VACCINATION 
The development of mandatory childhood vaccination laws in the 
United States dates back over two hundred years.28 Massachusetts was 
among the first states to enact legislation requiring the general population 
to receive smallpox vaccinations in 1809.29 In 1855, Massachusetts also 
became the first state to mandate childhood vaccinations as a prerequisite 
to school entry.30 Despite most states enacting similar school 
immunization laws during the late nineteenth century, widespread 
enforcement did not occur until after 1977 when the Childhood 
Immunization Initiative was launched in response to several measles 
outbreaks and declining immunization rates.31  
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Marian Chiriac, Romania Parents Face Fines for Refusing Child Vaccinations, 
BALKANINSIGHT (Aug. 3, 2017), https://balkaninsight.com/2017/08/03/romania-pushes-parents-
to-vaccinate-children-08-02-2017/ [https://perma.cc/G7M5-K37T]; Keet, supra note 23. German 
officials who proposed the legislation to establish the penalty similarly defended their proposal 
on public policy grounds—drawing parallels to the government’s ability to impose traffic fines 
on those whose reckless actions pose a danger to other drivers. See Melissa Eddy, Germany 
Considers Fines for Not Vaccinating Children Against Measles, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/world/europe/germany-measles-fine.html [https://perma. 
cc/GGG7-5LXF]. Germany’s health minister, Jens Spahn, elaborated: “The goal [of the bill] is 
not to fine people, the goal is to ensure that people are immunized.” Id.  
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 27. See id. at 562 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); infra Part III.  
 28. See LeFever, supra note 2, at 1051. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Alan R. Hinman et al., Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 122, 122 (2002). 
 31. Id. at 123 (“Since many vaccine-preventable diseases were primarily being transmitted 
in schools, a major effort was made to review the immunization status of school children and to 
immunize those in need. Over [the Initiative’s] two-year period, more than 28 million records 
were reviewed and millions of doses of vaccine administered. As a result, measles incidence 
declined and immunization levels in school children rose dramatically. Major emphasis was 
placed on enactment and enforcement of school immunization requirements, with the result that 
30 states formally changed their laws or regulations in the direction of increasing 
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A.  Protecting the Public Health 
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court ruled on the first 
major challenge to a law mandating vaccinations. In Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts,32 the Court established the authority under the states’ 
police power to restrict individual liberties in the interest of protecting 
public health.33 The Court denied a challenge to the City of Cambridge’s 
mandatory smallpox vaccination policy, holding that reasonable public 
health regulations are justified when the community’s health is at risk.34 
The policy required Cambridge residents to be immunized or face a fine 
of $5 (equivalent to over $128 in 2019 when adjusted for inflation).35 In 
the majority opinion, Justice Harlan reasoned that “[t]here are manifold 
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common 
good” and liberty secured by the Constitution does not guarantee freedom 
from restraint “at all times and in all circumstances.”36 The Court further 
dispelled the assertion that to be a valid use of the police power, 
immunization regulations must be based on universally held beliefs.37 In 
doing so, the Court asserted that: 
[t]he fact that the belief is not universal is not controlling, for 
there is scarcely any belief that is accepted by everyone. The 
possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that science 
may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive; for the 
legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the 
common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the 
spread of contagious diseases.38 
Due to the overwhelming public support in favor of vaccinations both 
domestically and internationally, the Court held that citizens cannot 
                                                                                                                 
comprehensiveness and more rigorous enforcement. By the 1980–81 school year, all 50 states had 
laws covering first entrants to school.”). 
 32. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).  
 33. See id. at 38–39. 
 34. Id. at 12–13, 37–38. 
 35. Id. at 12; see CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=5.00&year1=191301&year2=201901 
[https://perma.cc/J23W-44DH] (to adjust for inflation using the CPI Calculator, first place 
“$5.00” in the query box; then put “January” and “1913” [this was the earliest date the calculator 
allowed for] into the first two boxes below; then put “January” and  “2019” in the lowest two 
boxes; then click “Calculate”).  
 36. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26. 
 37. Id. at 35.  
 38. Id. (quoting Viemeister v. White, 72 N.E. 97, 99 (N.Y. 1904)). 
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ignore the legislature simply because they disagree as to the particular 
method chosen to protect the public health.39  
The principles established in Jacobson and subsequent case law have 
survived decades of evolving constitutional law.40 For example, over “the 
last several decades, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutionally 
protected ‘liberty interest’ in [adults] refusing unwanted medical 
treatment.”41 Yet the Court has been hesitant to establish broad liberty 
interests in bodily integrity as “fundamental.”42 The Court has, however, 
often ruled in favor of protecting the public health when balancing the 
rights of an individual against the interest of the state.43 
B.  Compulsory Vaccinations for School Admission 
Since Jacobson, the Supreme Court has clarified its ruling and 
expanded the scope of states’ power relating to mandates for children.  
Specifically, in Zucht v. King,44 the Court upheld vaccination 
requirements as prerequisites for school admissions.45 After public 
officials excluded Rosalyn Zucht from enrolling in both public and 
private schools for failing to provide a certificate of vaccination, Zucht 
brought suit claiming that the compulsory nature of the vaccination 
requirement violated her Equal Protection rights.46 The Court denied the 
claim, citing its prior Jacobson ruling and the police power of the states 
that explicitly allows for compulsory vaccinations.47 Additionally, the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the vaccination requirement, stating 
that “reasonable classification[s] may be freely applied,” and do not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because they are not “all-
embracing.”48 
  
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. See also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood 
Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 
BUFF. L. REV. 881, 909 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (noting that although states typically defer to 
parents on decisions regarding their children, “parental discretion is not unlimited . . . where 
parents’ decisions are deemed to endanger children’s welfare”). 
 40. Lawrence O. Gostin, Jacobson v. Massachusetts at 100 Years: Police Power and Civil 
Liberties in Tension, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 576, 578–79 (2005). 
 41. Id at 580. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44.  260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
 45. See id. at 175–77.  
 46. Id. at 175–76. 
 47. Id. at 176. 
 48. Id. at 176–77. 
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1.  Medical Exemptions 
While the Jacobson Court upheld the policy and fine behind the 
compulsory vaccination law at issue in that case, it also recognized that 
certain exceptions existed.49 Specifically, the Court recognized medical 
exemptions in situations where a vaccine treatment may unduly harm 
patients with predisposed medical conditions.50 The Court has not 
addressed a vaccination law that completely eliminates all medical 
exemptions; however, this is because no such restriction exists. Of the 
three states that currently bar NMEs, all three permit medical 
exemptions.51 To prevent parents from misusing medical exemptions (in 
the absence of NMEs) to escape immunization laws, two of these states—
Mississippi and West Virginia––require respective state health officials 
to review all medical exemptions.52 The lack of similar restrictions on 
medical exemptions within the United States reflects their universal 
acceptance. Consistent with this public perception and receptive to the 
medical necessity of certain exemptions, this Note does not advocate for 
the removal or restriction of medical exemptions in its proposed tax plan. 
Rather, this Note continues by addressing only the constitutionality of 
eliminating or altering the current state of NMEs, analyzing next the 
constitutional concerns surrounding Free Exercise and religious 
exemptions.  
2.  Free Exercise and Religious Exemptions 
While the Jacobson Court purposely carved out room for medical 
exemptions, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of religious 
exemptions with more scrutiny. In Prince v. Massachusetts,53 while 
addressing a religious objection to child labor laws, the Court related the 
issue to religious vaccination objections, stating that a parent “cannot 
claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for 
himself on religious grounds.”54 In rejecting the Free Exercise claim, the 
Court again affirmed the states’ right to regulate issues of public health, 
reasoning that “[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include 
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or 
the latter to ill health or death.”55 This decision established a foundation 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).  
 50. Id. 
 51. See Michael Devitt, Study Examines Fallout of California Vaccine Exemption Law, AM. 
ACAD. FAM. PHYSICIANS (Nov. 27, 2018, 8:47 AM), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-
public/20181127califvaccstudy.html [https://perma.cc/X3CL-2CKT].  
 52. Id.  
 53. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).  
 54. Id. at 159–64, 166.  
 55. Id. at 166–67. 
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for the public’s right to be free from—and parents’ duty to protect their 
children from—a preventable, potentially fatal disease.56 
Following Prince, the Court articulated a “compelling state interest” 
standard for evaluating Free Exercise claims.57 Despite the seemingly 
stringent language of the compelling-interest test, the Court generally 
sided with the government when individuals claimed that laws restricted 
their free exercise of religion.58 However, in 1990, the Supreme Court 
retreated from the strict scrutiny standard in Employment Division v. 
Smith,59 when it held that a law is valid under the Free Exercise Clause 
so long as it is religiously neutral and generally applicable.60 The Court 
also stated, “We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting 
conduct that the State is free to regulate.”61 Although the Supreme Court 
has not yet addressed a Free Exercise challenge to a compulsory 
vaccination law with zero religious exemptions available, the opinion in 
Smith suggests that there is not a strong historical basis for requiring 
religious exemptions.62 In contrast, mandatory school immunization laws 
are neutral laws of general applicability that do not appear to violate the 
Free Exercise Clause under Smith.  
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, Congress 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),63 which 
provided additional statutory protection against government actions 
interfering with the free exercise of religion.64 This attempt to restore pre-
Smith strict scrutiny levels of protection established religious exemptions 
to any federal regulation (generally applicable or otherwise) by imposing 
a “substantial[] burden” test on religious beliefs.65 Under this test, the 
government must prove that a given restriction was the least restrictive 
method of furthering a compelling government interest.66 As states move 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Herd Immunity and Immunization Policy: The Importance 
of Accuracy, 94 OR. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015). Authors who discuss the parental duty to protect children 
from the potential harms of vaccines tend to undermine the “parents’ [similar] duty to protect their 
child against [the] preventable, [yet] potentially fatal diseases” themselves. Id. at 3–4. 
 57. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).  
 58. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1297–99 
(4th ed. 2011) (discussing how the Supreme Court has rarely invalidated laws when applying a 
strict scrutiny compelling state interest analysis to alleged violations of religious freedoms). 
 59. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
 60. Id. at 879, 884–85. 
 61. Id. at 878–79. 
 62. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 58. 
 63. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2012)), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
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towards stricter vaccination laws that eliminate religious exemptions, 
challenges to these laws will likely increase in the coming years.67 
Therefore, any federal vaccination legislation should include an 
exemption from the RFRA to avoid this sub-constitutional limitation on 
restricting religious freedoms. 
II.  THE ANTI-VACCINATION MOVEMENT’S EFFECT ON HERD IMMUNITY 
The spread of disease is mitigated when a sizeable percentage of the 
population receives proper vaccination.68 Such widespread vaccination 
indirectly protects unimmunized individuals, including children who are 
too young to receive vaccinations and those who cannot be vaccinated 
due to preexisting medical conditions.69 This is the principle of herd 
immunity.70 Overall, the anti-vaccination movement has had detrimental 
effects on the safeguards provided by herd immunity. 
A.  Herd Immunity Thresholds 
When the majority of the population is vaccinated, it is more difficult 
for a disease to maintain a chain of infection.71 Therefore, when more 
people adhere to the proper vaccination schedules, the protective effect 
of herd immunity increases.72 In contrast, when only a small percentage 
of the population is vaccinated, the risk of a disease outbreak significantly 
increases.73 The unvaccinated members of the population are no longer 
indirectly protected, and each community member faces a higher risk of 
infection74—including members of the community who properly 
received their vaccination. This is because as the disease spreads, 
mutations occur that create new strains that are potentially resistant to the 
existing vaccine.75 “For some diseases, herd immunity may . . . be 
induced with as little as 40% of the population vaccinated. More 
commonly, and depending on the contagiousness of the disease, 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 
(10th Cir. 2015) (applying RFRA against the ACA’s contraceptive mandate), vacated sub nom. 
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).  
 68. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, APHA PHARMACY-BASED IMMUNIZATION DELIVERY: 
MODULE 2. OVERVIEW OF IMMUNOLOGY AND VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 8 (2017). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Vaccines Protect Your Community, VACCINES.GOV, https://www.vaccines.gov/basics/ 
work/protection/index.html [https://perma.cc/DTJ2-T3LY]. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Stephanie J. Schrag et al., Spontaneous Mutation Rate of Measles Virus: 
Direct Estimation Based on Mutations Conferring Monoclonal Antibody Resistance, 73 J. 
VIROLOGY 51, 51 (1999). 
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[immunization] rates may need to be as high as 80%-95%.”76 “For 
example, measles is so contagious that even with the highly effective 
[MMR vaccine], 83% to 94% of the population needs to be vaccinated to 
stop the spread of the disease.”77 These percentages represent what is 
known as the “herd immunity threshold.”78 Once vaccination rates for a 
particular disease reach this critical threshold, it is still necessary to 
continuously mandate immunizations to prevent future outbreaks. 
B.  Global Effects of Decreased Coverage 
The World Health Organization (WHO) recently identified the anti-
vaccination movement as a top ten global public health threat of 2019.79 
In discussing the danger of “[v]accine hesitancy,” the WHO stated that 
“complacency, inconvenience in accessing vaccines, and lack of 
confidence are key reasons underlying” the decreasing immunization 
rates.80 The WHO also pointed to the global 30% increase in measles 
cases as evidence of the anti-vaccination movement’s profound effect.81 
The MMR vaccine is particularly relevant in the discussion of the anti-
vaccination movement because—despite its effectiveness—its high herd 
immunity threshold lends itself to outbreaks when vaccination rates begin 
to fall.82 Researchers and public health officials are easily alerted of 
global anti-vaccination movements when countries that were close to 
eliminating diseases like measles now see a resurgence.83   
The most profound effects of decreasing MMR vaccinations have 
been seen across Western Europe and North America.84 By 2000, the 
national vaccination rate of Ireland had fallen below 80%, with areas of 
Northern Dublin averaging just 60% coverage.85 Similarly, in 2003, the 
MMR immunization rate in the United Kingdom fell far below the herd 
immunity threshold needed to avoid outbreaks—reaching as low as 61% 
in parts of London.86 Domestically, the United States’ childhood MMR 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Coll. of Physicians of Phila., Successful Herd Immunity, HIST. VACCINES, 
http://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/herd-immunity-0 [https://perma.cc/8TFU-4MD6]. 
 77. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, supra note 68, at 8. 
 78. Coll. of Physicians of Phila., supra note 76.  
 79. Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019, WHO, https://www.who.int/emergencies/ten-
threats-to-global-health-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/A4KC-ABVE].  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, supra note 68, at 8. 
 83. Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019, supra note 79. 
 84. Azhar Hussain et al., The Anti-Vaccination Movement: A Regression in Modern 
Medicine, CUREUS (July 3, 2018), https://www.cureus.com/articles/13250-the-anti-vaccination-
movement-a-regression-in-modern-medicine [https://perma.cc/3WW3-6XQZ]. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
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vaccination rate decreased 2% between 1999 and 2000.87 “[W]orldwide, 
there are estimated to be 20 million cases of measles and 164,000 
measles-related deaths each year . . . .”88 
Several recent measles outbreaks in the United States have been traced 
to international travelers and declining domestic vaccination rates.89  
When international travelers return to the United States with diseases they 
contracted overseas, they infect unvaccinated or under-vaccinated 
populations, resulting in outbreaks.90 The most recent and infamous 
example of a domestic measles outbreak occurred in late 2014, when an 
outbreak originating from the Disneyland Resort in Anaheim, California, 
resulted in over 125 people contracting the disease.91 “It was estimated 
that MMR vaccination rates among the exposed population . . . [may have 
been] as low as 50% and likely no higher than 86%. Physicians in the 
region were criticized for deviating from the CDC’s . . . recommended 
vaccination schedule” and in some cases even discouraging their patients 
to receive vaccinations.92 Following the outbreak, California passed a 
vaccination law in June 2015, banning personal and religious exemptions 
that allowed people to abstain from mandatory vaccinations.93  
Overall, the anti-vaccination movement threatens decades-old herd 
immunity safeguards and risks significant financial burdens to taxpayers 
who fund public disease prevention agencies like the CDC. A recent 
study conducted by the American Medical Association estimated that “[a] 
5% decline in MMR vaccine coverage in the United States would result 
in an estimated 3-fold increase in measles cases for children aged 2 to 11 
years . . . [and] an additional $2.1 million in public sector costs.”94 The 
study also cautioned that these “numbers would be substantially higher if 
unvaccinated infants, adolescents, and adult populations were also 
considered.”95  
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id.  
 88. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, APHA PHARMACY-BASED IMMUNIZATION DELIVERY: 
MODULE 1. PHARMACISTS, VACCINES, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 4 (2017).  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Hussain et al., supra note 84; Jennifer Zipprich, et al., Measles Outbreak — California, 
December 2014–February 2015, CDC: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6406a5.htm?s_cid=mm6406a5_w [https:// 
perma.cc/T3F4-8G44]. 
 92. Hussain et al., supra note 84 (footnote omitted). 
 93. See generally S.B. 277, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015); Michael Martinez & Amanda Watts, 
California Governor Signs Vaccine Bill That Bans Personal, Religious Exemptions, CNN (June 
30, 2015, 10:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/health/california-vaccine-bill/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/2LTV-R5RU]. 
 94. Nathan C. Lo & Peter J. Hotez, Public Health and Economic Consequences of Vaccine 
Hesitancy for Measles in the United States, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 887, 887 (2017). 
 95. Id. 
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Although studies analyzing the coverage and effectiveness of the 
MMR vaccine are readily citable due to the timely nature of recent 
measles outbreaks, it is important to acknowledge how the baseless 
hysteria surrounding the efficacy of the MMR vaccine morphed to 
negatively affect vaccination practices broadly. For example, subsequent 
concerns about an alleged link between thimerosal—a mercury-based 
organic compound used as a preservative in vaccines96—and autism, 
continued fueling the movement against immunizations. Despite multiple 
credible studies finding no relationship for such a link,97 declining 
immunization rates among other vaccines such as the DTaP vaccine98 
have caused a dangerous increase in pertussis cases across the globe.99 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER 
The most effective way to increase vaccination rates, protect herd 
immunity, and raise revenue for national vaccination and disease 
prevention programs is for the federal government to use its taxing power 
to tax parents who unjustifiably refuse immunizations for their children. 
This can be achieved in one of two ways: First, the government could 
implement an affirmative vaccine-refusal tax structured around annual 
household income. Parents who fail to provide proof of mandatory 
vaccinations for their child would face an additional tax burden when 
filing their yearly tax returns with the IRS. Under an alternative approach, 
the government can prohibit parents who opt out of the mandatory 
vaccinations from receiving child tax credits when filing with the IRS.100 
While using the federal taxing power could increase vaccination rates and 
strengthen herd immunity, it will likely face numerous constitutional 
challenges. 
                                                                                                                 
 96.  Thimerosal and Vaccines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018) 
https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/safety-availability-biologics/thimerosal-and-
vaccines [https://perma.cc/3BFP-3KSF].  
 97.  See, e.g., id. (explaining that the amount of mercury present when thimerosal is used as 
a preservative in vaccines was shown to be “roughly the same amount of elemental mercury 
contained in a 3 ounce can of tuna fish”); Jon Heron et al., Thimerosal Exposure in Infants and 
Developmental Disorders: A Prospective Cohort Study in the United Kingdom Does Not Support 
a Causal Association, 114 PEDIATRICS 577 (2004); William W. Thompson et al., Early Thimerosal 
Exposure and Neuropsychological Outcomes at 7 to 10 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1281 
(2007); see also Reiss & Weithorn, supra note 39, at 891 (“There is also no scientific support for 
another allegation—that the recommended vaccine schedule clusters too many vaccines too early 
in a child's life.”). 
 98.  See infra note 180. 
 99. Jason M. Glanz, et al., Parental Refusal of Pertussis Vaccination Is Associated With an 
Increased Risk of Pertussis Infection in Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1446, 1449–50 (2009). 
 100. See generally What’s New with the Child Tax Credit After Tax Reform, IRS (Nov. 
27, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/whats-new-with-the-child-tax-credit-after-tax-reform 
[https://perma.cc/HA4S-JBG2]. 
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A.  History of the Taxing Power  
Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution authorizes 
Congress “[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay 
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of 
the United States.”101 The Taxing and Spending Clause was designed to 
finance the newly formed national government “by taxing individuals and 
private entities directly.”102 While Congress’s power to tax is extremely 
broad, no constitutional power is absolute. The Constitution specifically 
places constraints on direct taxes.103 Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the 
Constitution requires that direct taxes be apportioned among the states by 
population104—with the exception of income taxes, which are exempt 
under the Sixteenth Amendment.105  
Additionally, Congress cannot lay and collect a “tax” simply because 
it chose to categorize a monetary “penalty” under the Taxing and 
Spending Clause.106 In other words, a tax “penalty” cannot be imposed 
for violations of federal laws enacted under a different constitutional 
power such as the Commerce Clause.107 For example, in the landmark 
case Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,108 the Supreme Court invalidated a 
purported “tax” on employers who used child labor because it acted as a 
“penalty” to punish violations of a regulatory provision prohibiting such 
labor.109 The “exceedingly heavy burden” imposed by the tax, the scienter 
requirement that the employers “knowingly employed underage 
laborers,”110 and the fact that payments were made to the Department of 
Labor and not the IRS were all significant factors that influenced the 
Court’s ruling.111  
                                                                                                                 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 102. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Paradox of the Obamacare Decision: How Can the Federal 
Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1993, 2019 (2013); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (explaining that the Taxing and Spending Clause’s purpose 
was to ensure the federal government maintained adequate revenues to pay off debts, fund the 
military, and promote the welfare of the United States by facilitating international commerce). 
 103. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 104. See id. § 9, cl. 4. 
 105. See id. amend. XVI. 
 106. See Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 134 TAX NOTES 
97, 110 (2012). 
 107. Id. at 103–04. 
 108. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).  
 109. See id. at 34–35, 38.  
 110. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 565–66 (2012) (discussing the 
justifications of the scienter requirement in Drexel Furniture). Similar scienter requirements are 
common in punitive statutes. Id. at 566. This conforms to the general public policy that society—
through legislation passed by Congress—only “wishes to punish . . . those who intentionally break 
the law.” Id.   
 111. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. at 37. 
15
Consalvo: Taxation Without Immunization: Exercising the Federal Taxing Powe
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1528 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
The Constitution’s Taxing and Spending Clause empowers the federal 
government to raise revenues; however, unlike the Commerce Clause, it 
does not facially grant Congress the authority to promote a regulatory 
goal beyond regulations necessary to assess and collect taxes.112 Yet the 
Supreme Court has historically upheld tax measures with obvious 
regulatory effects when the exaction was primarily focused on raising 
revenue.113 
B.  The NFIB Decision 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA),114 commonly referred to as “Obamacare.” The ACA has been 
the subject of intense political debate from the time President Obama 
articulated his plan for healthcare reform, and it triggered massive 
litigation upon its enactment. Minutes after President Barack Obama 
signed the ACA into law, thirteen states, including the State of Florida, 
filed suit in federal district court alleging that the law was 
unconstitutional on multiple grounds.115 After the original plaintiffs filed 
the complaint, thirteen additional states, several individual plaintiffs, and 
the National Federation of Independent Business joined in the suit.116  By 
June 2012, the Supreme Court made its decision regarding the ACA’s 
constitutionality, specifically in regard to the “individual mandate” that 
“require[d] most Americans to maintain ‘minimum essential’ health 
insurance coverage”117 or else “make a ‘[s]hared responsibility payment’ 
to the Federal Government.”118  
First, the Court considered whether the individual mandate could be 
sustained under Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.119 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. at 38. 
 113. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 511–13 (1937) (upholding a 
statutory “tax” on firearms even though the statute was particularly harsh as to certain types of 
guns and Congress’s regulatory aim was clear); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63–64 
(1904) (sustaining a statute that imposed a vastly higher tax on artificially colored margarine 
because the law produced revenue and Congress had a legitimate objective to discourage the 
adulteration of food products, despite the fact that this tax also had the purpose of preferring 
manufacturers of butter rather than margarine). 
 114. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 115. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1263 (N.D. Fla.), order clarified, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 
519 (2012); see Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 540. 
 116. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 540. 
 117. Id. at 539 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010)).  
 118. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1)). 
 119. Id. at 548–58 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 6 [], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss6/5
2019] TAXATION WITHOUT IMMUNIZATION 1529 
 
 
The mandate failed under the Court’s analysis. Chief Justice Roberts, 
writing only for himself, reasoned that “[t]he power to regulate 
commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be 
regulated.”120 “The individual mandate . . . does not regulate existing 
commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in 
commerce . . . on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate 
commerce.”121 Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the 
Government’s arguments that all people are “active in the market for 
health care”122 or “will, at some unknown point in the future, engage in a 
healthcare transaction.”123 
Upon determining that the mandate could not survive under the 
Commerce Clause, the Court then analyzed whether it could be sustained 
as an Article I tax.124 Congress, however, had repeatedly described the 
mandate as “penalty,” not a “tax.”125 To overcome this hurdle, the Chief 
Justice invoked a canon of statutory interpretation that “if a statute has 
two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts 
should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”126  
1.  Penalty or Tax? 
When distinguishing penalties from taxes, the Supreme Court has 
explained, “[I]f the concept of penalty means anything, it means 
punishment for an unlawful act or omission.”127 Revenue generation 
should be the main purpose behind a tax. That is not to say, however, that 
a tax cannot be enacted with the intent to affect individual conduct.128 
“[T]axes that seek to influence conduct are nothing new.”129 For instance, 
taxes on the sale of tobacco now “compose more than half the retail price 
of cigarettes.”130 These taxes are not designed solely to raise government 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 550 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  
 121. Id. at 552.  
 122. Id. at 556 (quoting Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 7, 18, 34, 50, 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398)).  
 123. Id. at 557. 
 124. Id. at 561. 
 125. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 543–46 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. at 562 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). 
 127. Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators 
of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)). 
 128. Id.; see Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some 
measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as 
compared with others not taxed.”). 
 129. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 567. 
 130. Id. 
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revenue, but rather “to encourage people to quit smoking.”131 The courts 
have similarly upheld other obvious regulatory measures such as taxes on 
marijuana132 and gun sales.133 
While the individual mandate in NFIB would have raised considerable 
revenue, the payment was clearly more focused on inducing the purchase 
of health insurance.134 However, in his majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts pointed to the mandate’s lack of “negative legal 
consequences.”135 The failure to purchase health insurance was not itself 
unlawful.136 There were no consequences for not buying health insurance, 
other than “requiring a payment to the IRS.”137 Therefore, “if someone 
chooses to pay [the tax] rather than obtain health insurance, they [would] 
fully compl[y] with the law.”138 
2.  The Individual Mandate Is Not a Direct Tax 
Even if the Taxing and Spending Clause enables Congress to impose 
a tax on individuals who choose not to obtain health insurance, “any tax 
must still comply with other requirements in the Constitution.”139 In 
NFIB, the plaintiffs argued that the shared responsibility payment 
violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution, which provides 
that “[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be 
taken.”140 This clause requires that any direct tax must be “apportioned 
so that each State pays in proportion to its population.”141 Although 
Congress had made no effort to apportion the individual mandate tax 
among the states, the Court pointed to the income tax exception 
permissible under the Sixteenth Amendment.142 The Court articulated its 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See id.; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 687 (4th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1873) (“[T]he taxing power is often, very 
often, applied for other purposes, than revenue.”). 
 132. See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950). 
 133. See Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 511–12.  
 134. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 567. 
 135. Id. at 568. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 570.   
 140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4; see Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 570. 
 141. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 570. 
 142. Id. at 571; see Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1881) (holding “that direct 
taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that 
instrument, and taxes on real estate . . . .”); see also Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 
U.S. 601, 618 (1895) (expanding the interpretation of Springer to include to include taxes on 
personal property and income from personal property and striking down aspects of the federal 
income tax), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XVI; cf. Eisner v. 
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distinction between a direct tax and the shared responsibility payments as 
follows: 
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall 
within any recognized category of direct tax. It is not a 
capitation. Capitations are taxes paid by every person, 
“without regard to property, profession, or any other 
circumstance.” The whole point of the shared responsibility 
payment is that it is triggered by specific circumstances—
earning a certain amount of income but not obtaining health 
insurance. The payment is also plainly not a tax on the 
ownership of land or personal property.143 
In short, the Court concluded that “[t]he shared responsibility payment 
is thus not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the several 
States.”144 
3.  Breadth of Congressional Taxing Power  
Speaking for the majority of the court, Chief Justice Roberts 
addressed a fundamental objection as to the taxing power’s scope.145 How 
can the federal government impose a burden on an omission—a lack of 
health insurance—not an act?146 This concern was a primary component 
that the Court used to strike down the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause, and the dissenting Justices raised this concern as 
well—regarding objections under the taxing power.147 But Chief Justice 
Roberts quelled these objections with a three-part analysis.148 Most 
importantly, he explained that “it is abundantly clear the Constitution 
does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation through 
                                                                                                                 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1920) (applying the Sixteenth Amendment to overturn the 
income tax apportionment requirement in Pollock, while upholding the requirement for taxes on 
personal property). 
 143. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 571 (citation omitted).  
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 571–72. 
 146. See id. at 572–74.  
 147. Id. at 571–72 (“If it is troubling to interpret the Commerce Clause as authorizing 
Congress to regulate those who abstain from commerce, perhaps it should be similarly troubling 
to permit Congress to impose a tax for not doing something.”); see id. at 661–70 (Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why 
the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U.  J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 607–
13 (2010) (setting forth the arguments that were later adopted by the joint dissent). Barnett was a 
key contributor to the litigation challenging the ACA. See generally Randy E. Barnett, No Small 
Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 
65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013) (describing his litigation experience fighting the ACA from the 
perspective of both an academic scholar and a lawyer). 
 148. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 572–74. 
19
Consalvo: Taxation Without Immunization: Exercising the Federal Taxing Powe
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1532 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
inactivity.”149 By its nature, a capitation “is a tax that everyone must pay 
simply for existing, and [such a tax is] expressly contemplated by the 
Constitution.”150 The Court held that while the Constitution protects 
individuals who abstain from activity regulated under the Commerce 
Clause, no such protection exists with respect to taxes.151  
But “Congress’s ability to use its taxing power to influence conduct is 
not without limits.”152 The Court has historically demonstrated the ability 
to aggressively limit the scope of the taxing power by invalidating 
penalties clearly designed to regulate behavior beyond the scope of 
federal authority.153 Recently, the Court has declined the opportunity to 
closely examine regulatory motives or coercive effects of revenue-raising 
measures.154 Similarly, in NFIB, the Court explained that the individual 
mandate’s shared responsibility payment “pass[ed] muster as a tax under 
our narrowest interpretations of the taxing power.”155 Because the 
mandate fit within the Court’s strictest limits of the taxing power, Chief 
Justice Roberts declined to establish a precise point at which a penalty 
becomes so punitive that the taxing power cannot authorize it.156 
“[A]lthough the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its 
power to regulate commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress 
the same degree of control over individual behavior.”157 A regulation 
validly enacted under the Commerce Clause allows the federal 
government to enforce regulations with its full and complete power.158 
Congress can command individuals to conform to the regulation with the 
threat of potential criminal sanctions.159 These potential sanctions can 
take the form of fines and imprisonment, both of which have the added 
consequences that accompany the brand of a criminal.160 “By contrast, 
Congress's authority under the taxing power is limited to requiring an 
individual to pay money into the Federal Treasury, no more.”161 If the tax 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id. at 572. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.; see also Letter from Benjamin Franklin to M. Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 12 THE 
WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 161 (John Bigelow ed., 1904) (“Our new Constitution is now 
established . . . but in this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”). 
 152. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 572. 
 153. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 53–57, 78 (1936) (holding 
unconstitutional a tax imposed on farmers by the Agricultural Adjustment Act). 
 154. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 573; see also, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 27–31 
(1953), overruled in part by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
 155. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 573. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 574. 
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is paid timely, “the Government has no power to compel or punish 
individuals” to conform to the underlying intent of the regulation.162 
While tax burdens may still cause significant hardship, the imposition of 
a tax nonetheless leaves individuals with the choice to act (or not act), so 
long as they are willing to pay a tax levied on that action or omission.163 
IV.  POST-NFIB FEDERAL VACCINE-REFUSAL TAX PLAN 
Although allowing states to regulate mandatory immunization 
requirements was once effective,164 such regulatory efforts have recently 
begun to fail and threaten public herd immunity protections against 
vaccine-preventable diseases.165 This failure is in part because school 
mandates alone no longer do the trick. Simply checking a box on a school 
entrance form claiming exemption based on “personal belief” is an 
ineffective checkpoint that parents continue to abuse. Additionally, the 
growing popularity of homeschooling among this subpopulation calls for 
legislative reform to ensure mandatory vaccination requirements are 
being met, regardless of a child’s educational platform. The anti-
vaccination movement’s roots in metropolitan areas consisting of middle- 
and upper-middle-class Americans166 allow a vaccine-refusal tax, 
implemented through tax return fillings, to effect the most change among 
this subset of the population.  
A tax or loss of child tax credit for failure to follow a required 
immunization schedule will equally serve to generate revenue while 
inducing the regulatory purpose of increasing immunization rates for 
select vaccine-preventable diseases. As of the 2018 tax year, the child tax 
credit increased from $1,000 to $2,000.167 The credit is now also 
refundable up to $1,400, meaning “[i]f a taxpayer doesn’t owe any tax 
before claiming the credit, they will receive up to $1,400 as part of their 
refund.”168 Additionally, the “earned income threshold” of the credit 
requires that families must claim an income of at least $2,500 to qualify 
for the credit.169 These requirements—and the fairly moderate amount of 
the potential credit—ensure that people except those at the very bottom 
or the very top of the income distribution brackets would most notice the 
impending loss of the credit. Implementing a vaccination requirement as 
an additional qualification for the child tax credit would therefore have 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See supra Part I. 
 165. See supra Part II. 
 166. See Olive et al., supra note 3, at 7.  
 167.  See IRS, supra note 100.  
 168.  Id. 
 169. Id. 
21
Consalvo: Taxation Without Immunization: Exercising the Federal Taxing Powe
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
1534 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
the most influence on middle-income families, where the majority of the 
participants in the anti-vaccination movement reside.170  
Moreover, any revenue generated from this tax plan can serve to fund 
national vaccination programs, disease containment and outbreak 
prevention, and other public health initiatives. “[T]axes that seek to 
influence [regulatory] conduct are not[] new.”171 Historically, taxes are 
often enacted to both raise revenue and curb individual conduct.172 Courts 
have permitted such revenue to be earmarked for purposes other than 
general revenue: taxes on cigarettes provide funds to the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,173 and revenues raised from 
vaccinations finance an injury-compensation fund under the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.174 If courts are willing to uphold taxes 
such as these, which show clear regulatory purpose,175  then it seems only 
logical to similarly uphold a reasonable vaccination tax initiative that 
addresses what the Court itself has described as a valid interest in 
protecting the public health.  
A.  Implementation 
The CDC releases yearly recommended immunization schedules for 
children from birth to six years old.176 Included in this report is a list of 
vaccine-preventable diseases and their potentially deadly health 
outcomes.177 Any federal vaccine-refusal tax should include the 
preventable diseases and accompanying vaccinations listed below in 
Table 1.178  
                                                                                                                 
 170.   See Olive et al., supra note 3, at 7.   
 171. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 567 (2012). 
 172. Id.; see Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some 
measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as 
compared with others not taxed.”). 
 173. See, e.g., United States v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc., 899 F.3d 954, 962–63 (9th 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2691 (2019). See also Fact Sheet: Tobacco Enforcement, 
BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES (May 2018), https://www.atf.gov/ 
resource-center/fact-sheet/fact-sheet-tobacco-enforcement [https://perma.cc/UCN6-MMRJ]. 
 174. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755, 3756-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-33 (2012)). 
 175. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27–30, 39 (1905). 
 176. 2019 Recommended Immunizations for Children from Birth Through 6 Years Old, CDC 
(2019) [hereinafter Immunizations], https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/downloads/parent-
ver-sch-0-6yrs.pdf [https://perma.cc/SCB3-W77L]. 
 177. Id. 
 178.  Not all doctors are true believers in the recommended immunization schedule proposed 
by the CDC. See Olga Khazan, The Shadow Network of Anti-Vax Doctors, ATLANTIC (Jan. 
18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/01/when-the-doctor-is-a-vaccine-
skeptic/513383/ [https://perma.cc/S8EH-SHXC]. Such doctors may raise federalism objections 
to this tax plan, arguing that it intrudes on their professional freedom to practice medicine 
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Table 1: Preventable Diseases179 
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases and the Vaccines that Prevent Them 
Disease  Vaccine180  Disease spread by  Disease complications 
Chickenpox Varicella 
vaccine 
Air, direct contact Infected blisters, bleeding disorders, 
encephalitis (brain swelling), 
pneumonia (infection in the lungs) 
Diphtheria  DTaP 
vaccine  
Air, direct contact Swelling of the heart muscle, heart 




type b)]  
Hib 
vaccine  
Air, direct contact Meningitis (infection of the covering 
around the brain and spinal cord), 
intellectual disability, epiglottitis 
(life-threatening infection that can 
block the windpipe and lead to 
serious breathing problems), 
pneumonia (infection in the lungs), 
death 






Liver failure, arthralgia (joint pain), 
kidney, pancreatic and blood 
disorders 
Hepatitis B  HepB 
vaccine 
 
Contact with blood 
or body fluids  





Flu vaccine Direct contact, 
contaminated food 
or water 
Pneumonia (infection in the lungs) 
Measles  MMR 
vaccine  
Air, direct contact 
 
Encephalitis (brain swelling), 
pneumonia (infection in the lungs), 
death 
Mumps  MMR 
vaccine  
Air, direct contact  Meningitis (infection of the covering 
around the brain and spinal cord), 
encephalitis (brain swelling), 
[i]nflammation of testicles or ovaries, 
deafness 
                                                                                                                 
according to their respective state’s restrictions. For a response to such concerns see Lars Noah, 
Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 149, 159–60 (2004). 
 179. Notably, Table 1 does not include the column for “Disease symptoms” which is located 
in the original table. See Immunizations, supra note 176. This omitted column describes the mild 
to severe symptoms that could be present when each disease is contracted, which is mirrored by 
the column describing the potential “Disease complications” arising from those symptoms. Id.  
 180. The DTaP vaccine combines protection against diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis. Id. 
Similarly, the MMR combines protection against measles, mumps, and rubella. Id. After each 
vaccine name in the original table, the column reiterates the name of the disease prevented by 
each vaccine—i.e., the disease in the column left adjacent. These reiterations have been omitted 
for conciseness.  
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Air, direct contact Pneumonia (infection in the lungs), 
death 
 
Polio  IPV 
vaccine 
Air, direct contact, 







Air, direct contact Bacteremia (blood infection), 
meningitis (infection of the covering 
around the brain and spinal cord), 
death 





Air, direct contact Very serious in pregnant women—
can lead to miscarriage, stillbirth, 
premature delivery, birth defects 
Tetanus  DTaP 
vaccine  
Exposure through 
cuts in skin 
Broken bones, breathing difficulty, 
death181 
 
To identify the individuals who may be charged with the vaccine-
refusal tax, the implementation must be more stringent than a check-off 
box on the IRS 1040 Tax Form. If this were the case, the tax would have 
no effect on increasing immunization rates because parents who currently 
check the box on personal-belief exemptions for school forms would 
similarly check the box again on their tax filings. Instead, supporting 
documentation such as a certificate of vaccination or certified letter from 
a health professional––similar to the documentation required to prove 
employer insurance coverage under the ACA––should be required along 
with the tax form.182  
To avoid the apportionment requirement of Article I,183 the payment 
of a vaccine-refusal tax must mirror the individual mandate of the ACA 
and be “triggered by specific circumstances”184––in this case, earning a 
certain amount of income but not maintaining the required immunization 
schedule. Similarly, because the taxing power is typically “limited to 
require[] . . . individual[s] to pay money into the Federal Treasury,”185 the 
suggested tax should be levied and collected by the IRS. Having a tax 
“penalty” be collected by another agency, such as the child labor “tax” 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id.  
 182.  Any requirement should also be mindful of the possibility that spot shortages of certain 
vaccines, as has happened in the past, may require that mandates be waived in times of shortages. 
See Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and 
other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 743–45 (2003) (describing how vaccine shortages following 
September 11, 2001—and similar shortages in the mid-1980’s—posed a significant risk to public 
health). 
 183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
 184. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012). 
 185. Id. at 574. 
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collected by the Department of Labor in Drexel Furniture,186 would open 
any vaccine-refusal tax to potential violations of the taxing power.  
Like the mandate in NFIB, if the vaccine-refusal tax is paid timely, 
“the Government has no power to compel or [further] punish individuals” 
to conform to the underlying intent of the regulation.187 While an 
additional tax burden may still cause significant hardship, the imposition 
of the tax nonetheless leaves individuals with the choice to receive the 
required immunizations or to pay a tax levied on their omission.188 This 
implementation would mirror not only NFIB, but the Supreme Court 
rulings on state-implemented taxes as well. While the local tax in 
Jacobson was obviously not subject to the same limitations as the federal 
taxing power, it essentially allowed citizens who opposed the smallpox 
vaccine to purchase––for a relatively small price––a license to threaten 
the health of their neighbors.189 Even more so, the compulsory 
requirements in Zucht appeared more coercive, and applied to a situation 
with far less an emergency, yet the Supreme Court still greenlighted the 
vaccination requirement.190   
B.  Permitted Exemptions 
For the vaccine-refusal tax to accomplish its primary goal of 
increasing national immunization rates, exemptions to the tax must be 
few. This begins with the removal of religious exemptions mirroring the 
actions of states such as California, Mississippi, and West Virginia. 
While it is unclear from case law whether the Supreme Court would 
specifically uphold an immunization law with no religious exemption, the 
Free Exercise doctrine has become less protective since the Smith 
decision in 1990. Under Smith, laws that are neutral and of general 
applicability, yet “infringe” upon the free exercise of religion, do not 
appear to violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.191 In 
an effort to circumvent barring religious exemptions completely, some 
states have adopted “genuine and sincere” religious exemptions.192 
However, exemptions framed in these terms have been rejected in lower 
courts for Establishment Clause problems relating to potential 
interpretations in the government’s definition of “sincerity.”193 As such, 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922). 
 187. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 574. 
 188. See id.  
 189. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905). 
 190. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922). 
 191. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 884–85 (1990). 
 192. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 193. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Boozman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (adopting 
similar reasoning in a similar circumstance). 
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a vaccine-refusal tax of neutral and general applicability will have more 
success under the Free Exercise line of cases, which is losing its teeth as 
it trends away from its previous strict scrutiny standard.  
As mentioned earlier, this Note does not advocate for the removal of 
medical exemptions or for stricter checks on the judgment of doctors who 
grant such exemptions. A recent study analyzing vaccination laws in 
California warns against the lingering potential for outbreaks in areas 
where medical exemptions increased 250% following the removal of all 
nonmedical exemptions.194 However, the study notes that many of the 
areas that saw drastic increases in medical exemptions previously had the 
highest rates of Personal Belief Exceptions.195 Overall, the study 
concluded that school immunization rates increased from 92.8% to 95.1% 
in the two years after nonmedical exemptions were removed.196  
A similar reaction will likely occur upon the implementation of a 
federal vaccine-refusal tax; however, there are steps that can be taken to 
mitigate this response. The WHO advocates that health professionals, 
especially community-based providers, “remain the most trusted 
advisor[s] and influencer[s] of vaccination decisions, and they must be 
supported to provide trusted, credible information on vaccines.”197 If 
health professionals develop standardized methods for granting medical 
exemptions, then additional government intervention would not be 
necessary. Only if medical exemptions face as much abuse as current 
nonmedical exemptions may it be necessary to follow along with the few 
states that call for medical exemptions to be reviewed by additional state 
(or in this case federal) health officials.198  
CONCLUSION 
Vaccines provide an “incredibly cost-effective preventive health 
service[].”199 “In addition to saving lives, vaccines prevent illness and 
reduce [societal] costs” related to necessary disease prevention methods 
that accompany outbreaks.200 According to estimates, routine childhood 
vaccinations among children born between 1994 and 2003 have 
prevented: 
 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Salini Mohanty et al., Experiences with Medical Exemptions After a Change in Vaccine 
Exemption Policy in California, 142 PEDIATRICS 1, 2 (2018).  
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019, supra note 79. 
 198. See Devitt, supra note 51. 
 199. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N, supra note 88, at 3. 
 200. Id. at 3–4. 
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• 322 million cases of disease[;]  
• 1.4 million hospitalizations[;]  
• 56,300 deaths[;] 
• $4.2 billion of direct health care costs[; and]  
• $1.5 trillion of societal costs.201  
As vaccination rates continue to decrease, the financial and health 
impacts on public safety––for both those immunized and those not––are 
at risk.202 To return vaccination rates to levels that maintain herd 
immunity thresholds, Congress must pass legislation to promote 
vaccination efforts, raise revenue, and fund the fight against outbreaks.  
Currently, the entire public is responsible for the burden of funding 
these initiatives.203 That burden must shift and fall more squarely upon 
the individuals who refuse to acknowledge that remaining properly 
immunized against vaccine-preventable diseases is a fundamental 
necessity for protecting the public health. The global trend to increase 
vaccination rates and fight outbreaks has already resulted in similar fines 
and taxes as those advocated in this Note.204 Parents who, without a 
medical exemption, refuse to follow the mandatory childhood 
vaccination schedule must therefore be required to fund the public burden 
that their choice not to vaccinate creates. 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Orenstein et al., supra note 16. 
 203. Lo & Hotez, supra note 94, at 890. 
 204. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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